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COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST LAW
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

By
Roy J. Girasa*
Pace University

Antitrust law in the Unites States and in Japan are
fundamentally similar. There are, however, significant
and minor differences. Both aspects will be explored in
this paper. We will first summarily examine the nature
of antitrust law in the United States and then compare
its common and dissimilar characteristics with that of
Japan.
There are three basic statutes which together Wi·th
their amendments define antitrust prohibitions and
sanctions in the United States. They are: the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the
Federal Trade Commission Act to 1914.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 1
The act as amended states:
Section
1
"Every
contract,
combination in the form of trust or
otherwise,
or
conspiracy,
in
restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make
any such contract or engage in any
such combination or conspiracy shall
be guilty of a felony ...
Section 2
"Every person who shall
monopolize,
or
attempt
to
monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony ... "
Jurisdiction
The
constitutional
basis
for
Congressional intervention in antitrust activities is
*J.D.,
Ph.D.,
Professor of Law,
Lubin School
Business, Pace University, Pleasantville,New York.
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its power under Article I, Section 8 to regulate
interstate commerce . Although the U.S. Supreme Court
initially interpreted the commerce clause
excluding
manufacturing as well as service industries, the court
found activity to be in interstate commerce if it
actually involves multi-state transactions or affects
persons in other states in little more than a minimal
way.
In
addition
to
interstate
commerce,
the
prohibitions also affect foreign commerce. Activities by
companies abroad which if domestic would violate the
statute and cause an effect within the United States,
come also within the constitutional power to regulate
commerce. 3
Conspiracy The Sh•rman Act, Section 1, prohibits
agreements or conspiracies to restrain trade. As in the
entire field of antitrust litigations, the wording of
the statute, though simple in appearance, is enormously
complex. This section is concerned with "horizontal"
restraints. The activity must involve more than one
legal person. Generally, a corporation cannot "conspire"
or contract with its officers, directors or employees to
violate the statute even though such persons are
4
affiliated with a subsidiary company.
conscious parallelism
An expressed agreement
between competitors clearly comes within the purview of
the statute. The difficulty arises when there is no such
agreement but the conduct of the parties exhibit
behavior which the courts may prohibit. In one case,
5
Interstate Circuit. Inc. v. United States , the United
states Supreme Court held that a conspiracy contract or
combination may be formed without direct proof of such
an agreement. It would be sufficient to show that
participants acted in a substantially similar manner,
possessed the motive for so acting and had knowledge of
the actions which would be taken by the other parties.
"Rule of reason" v. per se" illegality. The statute
forbids conduct which restrains trade. Although the
Supreme court initially gave literal application to the
statutory wording so as to forbid all conduct having any
restraint on trade, it later modified its ruling so as
to prov;.de that only unreasonable restraints would be
banned.
Under the rule of reason, the Court would
determine whether or not conduct was illegal by
examining a variety of factors such as the nature of the
restraint, its purpose, possible benefits to the public,
harmful effects and other factors. Nevertheless, there
were certain types of conduct which were by their very
nature (per se) violative of the Sherman Act. These
include:

{1) Price fixing Any agreement between competitors
whose purpose is to raise, depress or stabilize
in interstate or foreign commerce is per se unlawful.
( 2)
Division
of
markets.
Any
arrangement
by
competitors on the same distributive level ' which
or
implicitly
divides
territories
is
wrongful.
Even indirect divisions of markets which
affect interstate or foreign commerce is prohibited. 9
(3) Boycotts Agreements betweenwcompetitors which
prohibit
them
from
dealing
with
certain
other
competitors or trades are per se illegal.
(4) Resale price maintenance
It is useful for a
seller to dictate the price at which a buyer of the
goods may resell them. on·c e a seller has disposed of the
goods,
they may be resold at whatever price the
distributor or retailer desires.
"Rule
of
reason"
Not
all
restraints
are
automatically invalid under Sherman {1). In most cases
the "Rule of reason" applies, i.e., only unreasonable
restraints are prohibited. Examples include:
{1) Agreement to exchange data such as price
information. 10 tendency to stabilize prices rather than
allowing market forces to determine the price structure.
{2) Self-regulation by associations.
(3) Joint ventures in themselves are legal, i.e.,
two or more companies banding together to perform a
particular project (e.g., the construction of a dam,
building of a pipeline, etc.). The problem arises when
two or more competitors join together for unlawful ends.
Monopolies.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids
monopolizing or attempts to monopolize. It does not
forbid monopolies in and of themselves. There are two
elements necessary to establish an offense:
"{1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a SUPjfior product, business acumen or
historical accident."
Monopoly power is the power to control prices or
exclude competition. Crucial to an understanding of
monopolizing is the determination of the relevant
geographic or product market. Product market refers to
possible substitutes or reasonable interchangeability of
products.
Geographic market
is the area in which a
particular company and its competition operate. The area
may be nationwide, regional or local. Whether or not a
company appears to be monopolistic often depends upon
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the geographical area which the court determines to be
the relevant market.
Wilful act. In addition to possessing power which
alone is not sufficient to be violative of the statute,
a company must commit an act to acquire or enhance its
monopoly power. If a company becomes a monopoly simply
because others fail to enter the market or because of an
exclusive product, there is no violation of Sherman.
Attempts and conspiracies to monopolize
are also
prohibited by Sherman (1). Attempt relates to the effort
made by a party to accomplish the goal of monopolizing,
intending to and committing an overt act in so doing.
The conduct required is similar to the conduct described
above for monopolizing.
Conspiracy
to
monopolize
is
the
attempt ·to
monopolize in unison with at least another person with
intent to monopolize.
Sanctions for violations
The Sherman Act is the
only statute of the three major antitrust laws which
imposes criminal as well as civil penalties. Individuals
who violate the Sherman Act can be imprisoned up to
three years and issued a fine up to $100,000.00.
Corporations can· be fined up to $1,000,000.00. Corporate
officers acting on behalf of the company can be fined up
to $5,000.00 and/or one year in prison. It is more
likely, however, that the federal government will
utilize the equitable powers of the court, i.e., the
prosecution will generally ask the Court to issue an
injunction to prevent and restrain the offending
conduct, divide the assets of a company, compel a
divestiture of subsidiaries of a company, grant licenses
to competitors, cancel contracts and other courtfashioned remedies.
THE CLAYTON ACT OF 1914 12
After a decade of antitrust experience, many of the
abuses which previously existed continued to prevail in
a variety of forms. They were due in part to experienced
corporation
counsel
who
devised
a
multi tude
of
techniques to avoid Sherman Act restraints. Congress
attempted to close these loopholes in 1914 by the
enactment of two major statutes, namely, the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These statutes, as
amended, cover a variety of abuses of which corporate
and other business persons should be aware.
Price Discrimination

Section 2 of the Clayton Act

as substantially modified by and known as the "Robinso':lPatman Act of 1936, "provided in subsection (a) that 1t
is unlawful to engage in price discrimination "between
different purchases of commodities of like grade and
quality •.. where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of comm?rc;:e ... " The
requires a number of prerequ1s1tes before a v1olat1on
will be found, namely:
(a) The persons involved must be engaged in
""
interstate commerce;
(b) There must be at least two sales between
different purchases at a discriminatory price .. There
must be two distinct sales, not merely a lease, l1cense,
consignment or other like arrangement;
(c) The sales must be fairly contemporaneous.
(d) Sales "of commodities of like goods and
quality" must be involved. Only tangible rather than
intangible products are within the statute.
(e) There must be a "discrimination in price." "Price"
is not merely the charge for the goods but includes
terms
of
sale
such as
credit
and
preferential
allowances. Allowing some buyers preferential credit
treatment may violate the statute.
Defenses A person charged with a Robinson-Patman
price
discrimination
offense
may
defend
against
liability
by
interposing
a
number
of
defenses
specifically authorized by the Act. These defenses
include:
(a) Cost differential Section 2(a) says that
the statute does not "prevent differentials which make
only due allowance for differences in the cost to
manufacture,
sale or delivery resulting from the
differing
methods
or
quantities
in
which
such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered ... "
A seller can classify an average customer into various
groups provided they are relatively homogenous.
(b) Changing conditions Another defense which
a person may interpose is proof that price variations
took place in response to a change in conditions such as
"actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods,
obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under
court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance
of business in the good concerned." The mr:t common
example is the lowering of prices for o tdated or
seasonal items.
(c) Meeting competition Section 2(b) states
that a seller can justify price differentiation by
"showing that his lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of
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a competitor, ol the services or facilities furnished by
a competitor." 1
Indirect price discrimination-broker allowances
section 2 (c) makes it unlawful "to pay or grant,, o:.; to
receive or accept, anything of value as a
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowanc.:; or
discount
in
lieu
thereof,
except
for
rendered ••. "
compensation for services and promotions
Section
2(d) makes it unlawful for a seller to pay for services
or facilities rendered or furnished by a buyer unless
such compensation is available on a proportionate basis
to all other customers of competing products. Section
2(e) forbids a seller from furnishing services or
facilities to buyers unless they are rendered to all
buyers on a proportionate basis.
Tying arrangements
Section 3 of the Clayton Act
forbids a seller or lessor of a commodity from
conditioning or tying its sale or lease to the purchase
or lease of another product. There must be at least two
separate products: the tying and the tied product. A
second requirement is that the seller or lessor have
substantial market power so as to be able to lessen
competition substantially. 14
. ,
Mergers
The first paragraph of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, amended in 1950 and 1980, sets forth the
merger provision:
"No person engaged in commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce
shall
acquire,
directly
or
indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital and
no
person
subject
to
the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another
person engaged also in commerce or
in any activity effecting commerce
where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce, in
any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."
The merger involves the combining of previously
separate firms into one having a common ownership and

control.
Originally,
the Clayton Act forbade the
acquisition of stock in another corporation which tended
to lessen competition. The Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950
amended Section 7 to include asset acquisitions as well
as stock mergers. 15
· ·
Remedies The Clayton Act provides only for civil
remedies as distinguished from criminal penalties. The
United States Government acts through the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission in its
administrative hearings. Private parties have broad
remedies for statutory violations directly affecting
them. Equitable remedies allowable to the government
include actions to: (1) enjoin or stop the defendant
from committing the offending act;
(2)
cause a
divestiture or severing· of relationship if an action
such as a completed merger has taken place;
(3)
preliminarily
enjoin
a
present
activity
pending
determination of the outcome; (4) compel a company· to
license or give permission to others to use its patents,
trademarks or copyrights; and (5) divide the assets of
a company. In addition, the parties may be induced to
enter into consent decrees whereby the parties settle
under certain terms and conditions. Approximately 85
percent of all cases are resolved in this manner.
The most potent private remedy is an action for
treble damages. A private party is able to collect three
times its provable damages plus a reasonable attorney's
fee for loss of profits, added costs attributable to the
forbidden activity and decrease in value, if any, of the
injured party's investment. The litigant, however, must
establish a causal relationship between its damages and
the action of the offending party.
Exceptions Exempted from the prohibitions of the
Clayton Act include labor unions and business concerns
controlled by other governmental agencies, such as
banks, railroads, airlines and stock exchanges.
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT OF 1914 16
The third major piece of legislation governing
antitrust activities is the Federal Trade Commission Act
enacted at the same time as the Clayton Act. The Act
created the Federal Trade Commission. Section 5(a) (1)
grants antitrust jurisdiction to the FTC by providing:
"Uniform methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful." Section 5 (a) ( 6) provides:
"The
Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons,
partnerships or corporations ... from using
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unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices on commerce."
The FTC is solely empowered to enforce Section
5(a) (1) above and to enforce, together with the Attorney
General, the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Section 5(a) (1)
is so broad that virtually all conduct prohibited by the
Sherman and Clayton Acts comes within its purview. For
example, conspiracy or attempts to monopolize, price
fixing, vertical and horizontal restraints are "unfair
methods of competition." The provision is broader than
the Sherman and Clayton prohibitions. Thus, certain
conduct not forbidden under these laws may be proscribed
under the Act.
The FTC is empowered to protect the consumer
against deceptive and unfair acts or practices such as
false and misleading advertising, deceptive claims,
nondisclosure of hazardous products and deceptive
warranty representations. It has the power to conduct
broad investigations of possible antitrust violations
•
•
•
I
1nclud1ng the 1ssuance of subpoenas. It may issue
guidelines, advisory opinions and enter into consent
decrees with persons who may be violating the laws
within FTC jurisdiction. It may sue in Federal Courts
for the issuance of an injunction and can issue cease
and desist ·order's directly, Violations of its orders can
result in civil penalties of up to $10,000.00 per day.
We will now review the manner in which
promulgates and enforces its antitrust laws.

Japan

Japanese Antitrust Law
The historical development of Japan's policy with
respect ot cartels may be divided into three major eras,
namely, the Tokugawa Shogunate Era (1603-1868) · the post
Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the post World
II Era.
Prior
the
governments were essentially
feudal1st1c 1n nature w1th emphasis upon the concept of
"wa" or social harmony which mandated that commercial
be resolved without litigation. Individual
r1ghts were subsumed to that of society. 17
The Tokugawa government was overthrown in 1868 and
by a
under the Emperor known as the
Me1J1
of 1868. The Restoration brought about
a
of the feudal based society into the modern
a
reformed monetary,
educational
and
system.
Government worked closely with
1ndustry to create ,, a unique form of Japanese
cap1tal1sm. As in the U.S., various cartels formed known

as 7he Zaibatsu combines, led by a number of families.
Unl1ke the u.s. which passed the several antitrust laws
referred to in this paper, the government virtually
fostered cartels and monopolies which it found easi1r to
control than a more pluralistic industrial complex. 1 The
four major Zaibatsu families of Missui
Mitsubishi
and Yasuda controlled 544
which
const1tuted almost half of the financial sector and a
third of heavy industry.
The allied victory over Japan led to a dissolution
the Zaibatsu groups. President Harry s. Truman • s
d1rective of September 6, 1945 to General Douglas
MacArthur
mandated
the development
of
democratic
o:ganizations
in
labor,
industry
and
agriculture
d1rected to peaceful ends, It stated:
"To this end it shall be the
policy of the Supreme Commander
(a) to prohibit the retention in or
selection of places of importance in
the economic field of individuals
who do not direct future Japanese
economic
effort
solely
toward
peaceful ends; and
(b) ro favor a program for the
dissolution of the large industrial
and banking combinations which have
exercised control for a great part
of Japan's trade and industry.
.
issued a Directive calling for the
d1ssolut1on of the Zaibatsu and other combinations of
enterprise, the abolition of private
and
the establishment of a competitive system. 1 Ultimately,
the statute, which was an enactment of these goals was
passed and made effective on July 20, 1947 and was known
as the "Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly
and Maintenance of Fair Trade. 1120 The Act was modeled
upon the three major u.s. antitrust enactments,
the
Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
comm1ss1on Act.
The Japanese Antimonopoly Act of 19472 1
The purpose of the Act is set forth in Section 1:
"This
Act,
by
prohibiting
private monopolization, unreasonable
restraint
of
trade
and
unfair
business practices, by preventing
the
excessive
concentration
of
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economic power and by eliminating
unreasonable
restraint
of
production, sale, price, technology,
and the like and all other undue
restoration of business activities
through combination agreements and
otherwise, aims to promote free and
fair competition, to stimulate the
initiative of entrepreneurs,
to
encourage business activities of
enterprises, to heighten the level
of employment and people's real
income and thereby to prevent the
domestic and wholesome development
of the national economy as well as
to assure the interest of consumers
in general."
The purpose clause clearly is reflective of the
goods of
the U.S.
statutes outlined above.
The
substantive requirements are set forth in Section 3 of
Chapter II which states that "No entrepreneurs shall
effect private monopolization of any unreasonable
restraint of trade." The section is a summary of the two
substantive sections of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Section 19
Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act by forbidding an entrepreneur from
employing unfair business practices. The Federal Trade
Commission Act created the Federal Trade Commission to
enforce the provisions for the Act. Enforcement of the
Japanese Antimonopoly statute is by the Fair Trade
Commission. The similarity in nomenclature is not
coincidental.
Section 2 of the Antimonopoly Act defines each of
the key words of Section 3. "Entrepreneur" is any person
who carries on a commercial, industrial, financial or
other business including officers, employers or agents
or thereof. "Private monopolization" refers to business
activities by any person acting alone or in combination
or conspiracy with other entrepreneurs [almost identical
to Sherman Act, Section 2. "Every person who shall
monopolize .... or combine or conspire with any other
person"] which excludes or controls business activities
of other entrepreneurs causing a substantial restraint
of competition in any particular field or trade
[Sherman: "Every contract combination .... or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or
among the several
States, or with foreign nations is declared to be
illegal."] "Unreasonable restraint of trade" is defined
as
business activities by contract or concerted
activities which mutually restrict their business

practice so as to fix, maintain, or enhance prices, or
to limit production, technology, products, facilities or
customers or suppliers causing a substantial restraint
of competition [Section 2(6)] This definition is very
similar to Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Fair Business Practices
The prohibition against
monopolization extends to international agreements or
contracts containing subject matter which constitutes
unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair business
practices [Section 6(1)]. Unfair business practices
refers to any act which tends to impede fair competition
and which:
( 1) unduly discriminates
against
other
entrepreneurs;
(2)
deals
at
undue
prices;
(3)
unreasonably
induces
or
coerces
customers
of
a
competition to deal with oneself; (4) trading with
another party so as to unjustly restrict the business
activities of the latter; (5) abusing one's bargaining
position; or (6) unjustly interfering with a transaction
between a competitor and its customer or causing an
officer or shareholder to act against the interest of
hisjher company. The definition again is reflective of
u.s. law particularly, the Robinson-Patman Act, with
respect to price discrimination and predatory pricing
practices (Section 2,3) as well as Clayton's prohibition
of tying and boycott (Section 3).
The last aspect of
the definition is similar to u.s. Common law injunction
against interference with contracts. (Pennsoil
litigation) .
The Fair Trade Commission further elaborated upon
the meaning of "unfair
practices" in its
notifications of 1953 and 1982. 2 Among the specific
prohibitions were:
Unduly refusing to deal with a certain entrepreneur
or restricting the quality or a substance of a commodity
or causing another to so refuse service [U.S. - boycott
provision of Clayton);
Price discrimination [Compare Robinson-Patman); "
Affording favorable or unfavorable treatment of
entrepreneur (Robinson-Patman 2(d)];
Unjustly excluding an entrepreneur from a trade
association or unjust discrimination against it; without
proper justification, supplying a commodity or service
excessively below cost or at a low cost on a continuous
basis
so
as
to
cause
difficulties
to
other
entrepreneurs;
Unjustly purchasing a commodity or service at a
high
price
as
to
cause
difficulties
to
other
entrepreneurs;
Wrongful inducement to customers of a competitor to
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deal with oneself by alleged unsubstantial claims that
one's commodity or service is better then competitor or
by· offering unjust benefits in the light of normal
business practices;
unjustly causing a
purchaser to
purchase a
commodity or service by tying it with another purchase
or otherwise coercing the party to deal with oneself;
Unjustly dealing with a party on condition that it
does not deal with a competitor;
Imposing resale price restriction without . p:oper
justification upon the purchaser of one's commod1t1es;
Abusing one's dominant bargaining position by
unfairly compelling the other party to purchase a
commodity or service not involved in the transaction
causing it to provide money, service or other econom1c
benefit not warranted under the circumstances, setting
or
changing
terms
of
the
transaction
in . a
disadvantageous way to the other party or
imposing a disadvantage upon the other party regard1ng
execution of the agreement;
Interfering with the formation of a contract or
inducing a breach of contract by a competitor;
Interfering with the internal operation of a
competitor by wrongful inducement of a shareholder in
its exercise of voting rights divulgences of secrets or
by any other means.
Filing
Section 6 (2) of the Act mandated that any
entrepreneur entering into a international transaction
which the Fair Trade Commission finds a tendency towards
unfair business practice or unreasonable restraint of
trade, shall file a report within 30 days with the FTC
together with a copy of the contract or agreement or a
memorandum of the substance of an oral agreement. Forms
are provided by the FTC in accordance with the nature of
the agreement. Failure to file such a report would
subject the entrepreneur to a fine of up to 2 million
yen and further subjects the offending officer, agents
or
committing the violation to a similar
fine.
No such comparable statute or regulation exists
in the u.s. 2'
Trade Association
The act specifically addresses
activities of trade association. Section 8(1) states:
"No trade association shall engage
in any one of the following acts:
i)
Substantially
restricting competition in
any particular field of
trade;
ii)
Entering
into
an

international agreement or
an international contract
as provided for in Section
6(1)
(Contracts
which
unreasonably
restrain
trade or unfair business
practices;
iii) Limiting the present
or
future
number
of
any
entrepreneurs
in
field
of
particular
business;
iv) Unduly restricting the
functions or activities of
the
constituent
entrepreneurs (meaning an
entrepreneur who
is a
member
of
the
trade
association; hereinafter
the same);
v) causing entrepreneurs
to do acts as constitutes
unfair
business
practices."
The reason why trade associations are specifically
addressed · is because historically these associations
were meeting grounds for the formation of cartels. Every
trade association is given 30 days to file a report with
the FTC of its formation (Sec. 8(2)) as well as for any
changes or termination thereof (Sec. 8(3) (4)).
The FTC guideline formulated in August,
1979
elaborated upon the statutory prohibition. Generally
they prohibit price fixing of every nature, enforcement
of resale prices maintenance, restriction of output,
restriction
of
governing
sales
territory,
and
competition, restriction concerning development or use
of technology, defamation of non-members and other
restrictions.
The remedy provided is similar to the remedy set
forth above but in addition thereto. The FTC is
empowered to
issue
a
dissolution
of
the
trade
association and take any measure to carry out the
statute.
Monopolistic Situations
If the FTC determines that a
monopolistic situation exists,
it may
order the
entrepreneur to transform a part of its business or take
any other measures necessary to restore
with respect to such goods and services.
The statute
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does place some limitations upon the FTC by foregoing
statutory injunction if such action by the FTC reduces
the business of the entrepreneurs to such an extent that
the cash required for the sale of goods or services will
rise sharply, undermines the financial position of the
entrepreneur or makes it
for it to maintain
its international competitiveness. 6
The FTC in making its determination is to consider
the entrepreneur's (1) assets, means of expenditures;
(2) officers and employees; (3) location of factories,
workyards and offices; (4) business facilities and
equipment; ( 5) the substance of intellectual property
rights; ( 6) capacity of production and sales and for
obtaining funds and materials and (7) aspects of supply
and distr!bution of supply and distribution of goods or
services. 7
A "monopolistic situation" is defined at length in
the Act in terms of market structure and market
performance such the situation occurs whenever such
structure or performance exists in an area of business
where the total amount of prices of goods of the same
description and those of other goods essentially similar
thereto are supplied in Japan or the total amount of
prices of
supplied in Japan is in excess of 50
billion yen for a one year period and; (a) the market
share of one entrepreneur exceeds 50% or the combined
share of entrepreneurs exceeds 75%; or (b) conditions
exist which make new entrants very unlikely; or (c)
where the increase in price for the goods or service or
the decrease therein is slight considering the charges
in the market place; and where the entrepreneur has
earned for excessive profit rate or is expending for
cost and administrative expenses far in excess of the
norm. 28
In such event the FTC shall notify the appropriate
governmental ministry of the monopolistic situation who
shall render his view regarding the existence or nonexistence of such a monopolistic situation as well as
his recommendation as to which measures should be taken
if such situation does exist. 29 A public
is then
held by the FTC to obtain the public's views. 3 The FTC
will then issue a
but only after it consults
with such minister. The complaint must be in writing
outlining the case. After the hearing in which all
parties present their position, the commission renders
its decision which may include the remedies heretofore
stated. 32
STOCKHOLDING, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES,

MERGER AND TRANSFER OF BUSINESS
The Act
addresses the prohibitions addressed by
President Truman to General MacArthur. To eliminate the
pre-war
Zaibatsu
combines,
the
Act
prohibits the formation of a holding company. A "hold1ng
company" is defined as: "a company whose principal
business is to control the business activities of a
company or companies in Japan by means of holding of
stock (including shares of partnership ... " 3 It applies
only to Japan and not to holding companies possessing
the shares of a foreign company.
Giant Company Giant companies also face restriction in
stockholdings. Any stock company, other than one engaged
in financial services (banks, insurance, securities),
whose capital is larger than 10 billion yen or whose net
assets are larger than 30 billion yen is not allowed· to
acquire stock in Japanese companies in excess of its
capital or its net assets whichever
is
larger.
Exceptions
include
governmental
corporations,
corporations engaged in development of industries as
permitted by a Cabinet Order and companies involved
international
business
or
foreign
investments.
Companies engaged in financial service have much
stricter limitations
purchases
5%)
stock of
mother company; 10% of 1nsurance compan1es .
The Act prohibits the purchase of any stock of a
company in Japan where the effect is to substantially
restrain competition in any field of trade. 36 Compare
section 7 of the Clayton Act which forbids the
acquisition of stock or other share capital of assets of
another corporation where the effect is to substantially
lesser competition or tends to create a monopoly. The
Japanese FTC, like the u.s. FTC has guidelines with
respect to mergers.
The FTC will closely examine all stockholdings
where the combined market share is 25% or more; the
combined market share is one-third and the combined
share of the top three companies is 50% or more where
there are seven or few competitors; and where the total
assets of one corporation is 100 bil}ion yen and the
other party is 10 billion yen or more. 7
Financial Company The Act restricts stockholding by a
financial company by forbidding the acquisition of
shares by a company engaged in the financial sector from
acquiring or holding stock of another company in Japan
to the extent of greater than 5 percent or 10 percent if
the purchase is of insurance company stock. The FTC is
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given
the
authority
t .o . grant
ex?eptions. with
consultation with the M1n1ster of F1nance 1f the
acquisition was the result of enforcement of a lien,
pledges
mortgage or payment of an indebtedness or
was of shares in a securities firm or it was
acquisition of stock in the form of trust property or
securities trust. 38
Interlocking directorates The Act forbids an officer or
employee of a company from holding a similar portion in
another company in Japan where the effect is to
substantially lessen competition in a field or trade. A
company in Japan cannot compel a competing company to
hire one of its officers or employees to act as an
officer in such other company. If an officer or employee
does possess such status and the total assets of either
company exceeds 2 billion yen, sfhe must file a report
with
FTC within 30 days of assumption of such
office.
Compare Section 8 of Clayton Act which
provides that "No person at the same time shall be a
director in any tow or more corporations, any one of
which has capital, surplus, and individual profits
aggregating more than $1,000,000 ... "
Restriction on purchase of shares by an individual The
Act forbids a person other than a company from acquiring
or ., holding stock of another company which
such
acquisition may restrain competition in such acquisition
is accomplished by unfair business practice. If a
purchase of shares in mutual competing companies exceeds
10 percent of the second companys he must file a report
with the FTC within 30 days of acquisition. 40
Restriction on mergers
The Act forbids mergers or
consolidation
(a)
where
the
effect
may
be
to
substantially restrain competition in any field or trade
or (b) when unfair business practices have been emf{oyed
in the course of such merger or consolidation.
All
mergers or consolidations must be done by filing a
report with the FTC and must wait for the expiration of
a 30 day waiting period from date of filing. The FTC may
extend the period to 60 days with consent of the
companies or shorten the said period. The FTC must file
its complaint or recommendation within the said waiting
period unless there has been false
made in
the filing with respect to important matters.'
Restrictions on acquisition of assets De facto mergers
are also subject to the preceding section where a
company acquires the business or fixed assets of a
competing company or leases most of the business of
another company or enters into a join profit and loss

account arrangement with another company. 43
It should be noted that the prohibition of this and
preceding section are applicable only within Japan. It
is not unlawful to merge or acquire assets in competing
companies beyond its borders.
Parallel Price Increases Historically, u.s. courts have
applied the concept of "conscious parallelism" where
direct proof of concerted price fixing or other wrongful
conduct has not been established but where conduct has
occurred and the parties had knowledge, motive and
substantifl unanimity with respect to each other•s
actions.
The Antimonopoly Act addressed similar
parallelism with respect ·to price increases. The FTC may
inquire
and
compel
a
report
from
entrepreneurs
requesting reasons for the
in price of goods and
services where the total price of goods or services · of
the same type is in excess of 30 billion yen and the
rises by the largest entrepreneur with an aggregate
market share in excess share in excess of 70 percent is
almost identical within a 3 month period. 45
Exemptions The U.S. exempts certain entities from the
antitrust laws. They include air carriers, agricultural
organizations, , motor,
rail
and
interstate
water
carriers, export trade associations, stack ·exchanges and
labor union. Similarly, exemptions are granted under the
Antimonopoly laws to persons engaged in a rail way,
electricity, gas and other enterprises which by nature
are monopolies. Other exemptions include those permitted
by law, monopolies arising under intellectual property
right enactments (patents, copyright, trademark), acts
of cooperative and statutory exception for agriculture,
consumer coops, labor unions,
and
public service mutual aid association. 6
Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law Violations of the
Antimonopoly laws are enforced against in four ways: (1)
administrative guidance; (2) formal action by the FTC;
(3) criminal
initiated by the FTC; and (4)
private litigation. 7 The FTC is given broad powers
under the Antimonopoly laws to initiate both civil and
criminal proceedings. Any person is allowed to file a
complaint with
the
FTC which may
undertake
an
investigation. The FTC then determines what action if
any, to undertake. A report of its investigation is
given to the complainant. If action is mandated, the FTC
then initiates the appropriate procedure
varies
depending upon the nature of the violation.
In

its

investigation,

the FTC may order persons
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affect or witnesses to appear for interrogation. It may
further order experts to appear and give expert
testimony, order submission of accounting books and
records and enter upon any place of business being
investigated to inspect conditions rf its operations as
well as its books and records. 4
A record of its
investigation must be maintained.
The FTC upon a
finding of a
violation of
monopolization of unreasonable restraint of trade, trade
association
violation
and
other
violations,
may
recommend that the persons affected take appropriate
measure to cure the violations. If the person accepts
the recommendation, a decision is rendered without a
formal hearing. If the FTC finds a violation of Section
7 of the Act (private monopolization or restraint of
trade), it may order the entrepreneur to pay the
Japanese Treasury a surcharge. If the
objects
timely, a hearing procedure will be commenced. 0
A formal hearing is initiated by the issuance by
the FTC of a complaint which is in writing and which
outlines the case. The respondent submits an answer.
Generally
a
hearing
examiner
then
conducts
the
proceeding in which both sides submit their evidence.
The hearing is public unless it is necessary to protect
trade
secrets.
The
commission
then
makes
a
determination,
based upon the hearing,
whether a
violation has taken place. A certified copy of the
written decision is served upon the respondent. The
respondent may bring on a lawsuit in Court to grant a
decision of the FTC; however, the findings of fact by
the FTC shall, if supported by substantial evidence, be
binding upon the Court. The Court may grant the decision
if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence
or is inconsistent with the constitution or other laws
or prders. 51

corporation's acquisition of a Japanese corporation or
its assets or at least "close contracts" with Japan.
service of process howevez::, must be .acco;'llplished 5
service upon a place of bus1ness or off1ce 1n Japan.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Anti trust laws of Japan and the U.S. have a
great deal of similarity. It appears initially that the
Japanese legislation may be stricter than the U.S. but
enforcement tends to be relatively lax. Nevertheless,
companies doing business in Japan must conform to the
statutory requirements to avoid conflict with local
authorities.
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